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156 Aram Eisenschitz 
sions between collectivity and individualism, between socialisation of 
production and private appropriation are now expressed between the 
New Right at a national level and business policies locally. Com-
munity poJicies may express that tension but they cannot provide a 
resolution. They represent what Roweis (1981: 172) calls, 'the con-
crete manifestations of the irreconcilability of capitalism and collec-
tive action'. 
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INTRODUCTION· 
The politics of urban development has received more attention in the 
scholarly and journalistic writing of the 19808 and 1990s. The goals of 
economic development policy in a community have been debated and 
studied; so tQo have the benefits of economic development program-
mes in urban America. Less attention has been given to the forma-
tion of development ideas. Who formulates economic or community 
development ~deasin a community? What are the policy goals at the 
formation stage? How do development plans fit into the community's 
goals? How are narrow development plans - such as those for sports 
stadiums - formulated? 
aties have many private interests that stand to profit from develop-
ment - from bankers to realtors, construction firms to construction 
labourers, downtown retailers to city hotels, restaurants to tour-
ism businesses. One particular kind of industry that is often both a 
beneficiary and a component of development is sports. To many 
communities, no business is more tinged with a special kind of public 
interest than its professional sports franchises. Their mere presence 
and even occasional winning streaks enhance a city's image and 
prestige; some help create favourable national reputations for their 
host cities. Because sports teams are increasin&ly seen as part of 
economic development programmes and area redevelopment plans, 
they have become central to the debate about who gains from 
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development in a community. Of particular concern is the frequent 
demand from team owners that the public sector should share a larger 
burden of the cost of hosting a sports franchise. This may include 
infrastructure improvements in areas of the city adjoining a team's 
stadium, construction of a publicly-owned stadium, or modifications 
in laws and regulations affecting a team's operation in the city. 
Should city taxpayers shoulder these costs? H city leaders reject such 
demands, will the franchise exit and take a toll on the community's 
image? More importantly, how do sports issues rise to the public 
policy agenda? How is sports franchise policy formulated in a com-
munity and under what conditions do sports-related public policies 
fulfill a community's development objectives? 
In this chapter we examine the politics of economic development 
and sports policy. We link sports policy formulation to the operation 
of urban regimes. A review of the theory of urban regimes and their 
role in policy formulation is followed by a review of sports develop-
ment literature. We specifically look at four areas in which regimes 
formulate policy related to sports: economic development, regula-
tion, fiscal policy, and conflict management. And we provide high-
lights of a study of Chicago and way in which the tension between 
development objectives and sports issues plays out in many cities. 
THEORY OF URBAN REGIMES, DEVELOPMENT, AND 
POLICY FORMULATION 
Urban governments try to maintain a healthy economic base - one 
that can produce needed tax revenues, create an acceptable quality of 
life, and provide jobs for community residents. At times, the pursuit 
of economic soundness may require a government to promote the 
development or redevelopment of land in the jurisdiction. Who sets 
the agenda for economic development in a community? Essentially, 
two sets of actors who have a stake in development outcomes set the 
agenda in most communities - '(t)hose who control investment capi-
tal ... (and) those who control public authority (Stone, 1987: 5)'. In 
other words, private economic interests and state and local govern-
ment leaders promote development agendas. In most instances the 
public agenda represents a compromise between these actors' com-
mon and separate objectives, shaped by the environmental demands 
and supports that also influence development policy. 
Bringing an idea for economic development to the policy adoption 
Community Development or Business Promotion? 159 
stage typically involves building a coalition and selling the idea as one 
that is in 'the public interest'. In fact, a broad definition of the public 
interest is frequently marshalled to justify such diverse economic 
development plans as downtown redevelopment, protected manufac-
turing districts, convention centres, and sports stadiums. How can 
each of these fit the definition of the public interest? Because, accord-
ing to Stone (1987: ~), each has been the outcome of a compli-
cated, conflictual process in which a 'governing coalition' or 'urban 
regime' mediates the diverse views of a community's interest among 
actors ip. the political system. These coalitions also advance their own 
conception of the publiC"interest, hoping to persuade the public that 
the common good is at stake in each of these projects (Banfield, 1961: 
265). 
The model of an urban regime seemingly represents the developing 
paradigm in urban politics today. Stone (1989: 6) says that a regime 
may be defined as 'the informal arrangements by which public bodies 
and private interests function together in order to be able to make 
and carry out governing decisions'. Elkin (1987) argues that urban 
regimes represent the means by which a community chooses various 
policies. From these perspectives, we are led to believe that the 
regime is the source of much policy formulation and that the regime 
helps establish the policy agenda in a community. This view places 
the regime at the centre of all major decision-making activities where 
it mediates and orchestrates the final policy decision. 
Regimes include both governmental and private citizen actors but 
their structure and policy agenda vary across communities. The tradi-
tional urban political machine represents one type of regime. In this 
'machine regime' community, the governing coalition is made up of 
political party leaders, ward-based bosses, and businesses with an 
interest in government contracts, favours, or protection. The agenda 
is dictated by which policies will perpetuate the power interests of the 
political machine and its supporting businessmen. Another kind of 
regime has been dominated by business. Elkin's (1987) study of 
Dallas found a 'corporate regime' that controlled policy formulation 
in the city, typically promoting downtown corporations' interests. 
Still another documented variety of governing coalitions has been 
labeled the 'progressive regime'. Policy formulation and agenda-
setting in the progressive regime community is much more open than 
in either the machine or corporate regime. Because the politics of the 
community is much more grass-roots oriented, government leaders 
in the coalition are more likely to embrace neighbourhood and 
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community groups'. social agendas rather than the business one (see 
Body-Gendrot, 1987). Moreover, the electoral base of mayors may 
be grounded in progressive group politics, leading mayoral adminis-
trations to champion neighbourhood and reform issues. aavel (1986) 
showed in a series of city case studies how progressive leaders pro-
moted policies - including economic development programmes - that 
had a distinctive set of social goals" embodied within them. A fourth 
example of a regime in which a weak coalition of small businesses and 
home owners has been linked to policy-stagnation is a so-called 
'caretaker regime' (see Whelan, 1987; Sanders, 1987). The inability 
to resolve parochial issues within the governing coalition prevents the 
formulation of major policies, leaving the agenda largely limited to 
routine policy items. 
This list of regime types is not intended to be exhaustive but merely 
suggestive of the variation that likely exits across communities. Each 
has a somewhat different structure: each seemingly formulates dis-
similar policy priorities. This informal partnership between city hall 
and the private sector, functions as the means through which major 
policy is made and the formulation of community development policy 
constitutes the sort of major decision that the urban regime mediates. 
What ends up on that development agenda has been modified by the 
regime to balance the needs of different actors. This is clearly true 
when 'sports policy' is part of the development agenda. 
SPORTS FRANCHISES AND THE COMMUNITY 
The role that sports franchises play in a community raises ·many 
questions. For example, are professional sports and stadiums good 
for the community? Are they a necessary link to economic develop-
ment and progress? What is the function of sports in the community -
development, tourism, prestige, image? Should communities 
financially support sports with public monies? 
Professional sports encompass economic, legal and public interest 
considerations and involve the competing demands of municipalities, 
team owners and taxpayers. The communities which host professional 
sports franchises have significant monetary and emotional ties to 
the teams. Most franchises play in facilities that are built, maintained 
and improved with public monies (Riess, 1989: 239). Moreover, 
team-city arrangements often include a variety of inducements such 
as the underpricing of rents and other fees, infrastructure construe-
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tion, and tax exempt status for stadiums. The local business com-
munity is also involved, since the presence of a franchise can have a 
positive economic impact. Hotels, restaur~ts and related businesses 
benefit from the influx of sports 'consumers'. Though difficult to 
measure,. a community's pride in having a franchise can play an 
important role. Cities like to see themselves as 'big league' and, in the 
name of public interest, public officials will work to prevent losing a 
fJ;anchise or seek.to gain one (Wong, 1985: 11-12). 
Knowing that the demand for teams is greater than the supply, 
many owners have fostered high-stakes bidding among cities by 
threatehlng to leave their host community if another offers a better 
deal. Sports problems have thus become a matter of public concern 
and issues surrounding professional sports franchises increasingly are 
appearing on urban policy agendas (see, for example, Buursma, 1988 
and Symonds, 1990). Recently, the power of eminent domain was 
used by two municipalities - Oakland and Baltimore - in an effort to 
acquire their football franchises and prevent the teams from re-
locating. 
Sports franchises have increasin8IY become another mobile indus-
try in cities. - making a decision to stay or relocate based upon the 
economic and business advantages of the new location and not on the 
economic failures of the previous location (Wong, 1985: 24-5: John-
son, 1984: 213). Now, in addition to considering factors that may 
'push' a team to a new location, the urban regime may find it 
n~ary to take into account the inducements cities might offer to 
'pull' a team to i~. New stadiums, luxury boxes, concession revenues, 
broadcasting arrangements, assumption of past debts - all become 
bargaining chips as cities engage in internecine warfare (John$on, 
1984: 213; Rosentraub and Nunn, 1978; Wong, 1985: 49-53). Typi-
cally, the incentives for the team to stay in a community involve 
formulation of econoniic development policies such as tax breaks, 
publicly-financed stadiums, area redevelopment and land acquisition, 
and generous lease and service arrangements. And all of this is 
usually offered under the guise of community development. 
Regimes can formulate policy in four areas that will affect the role 
of professional ,sports in the city: (1) economic development, (2) 
regulation, (3) fiscal policy, and (4) conffict management. In every 
case, unless the regime is willing to put the sports issue on the poliCy 
agenda, the mediation of sports franchise demands and wider com-
munity goals is unlikely to occur. 
Economic development and land use policies are· key elements in 
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the sports policy formulation, yet their availability often does not 
guarantee that the demands of team owners will be satisfied. Regimes 
may be willing to formulate a development policy for stadiums and 
encounter significant tension between social goals and economic 
objectives of team owners. The inability of team owners and the 
regime to resolve this conflict of objectives may help to push a team 
away. In their negotiations to keep the Dodgers in Brooklyn, team 
owner Walter O'Malley and New York City Parks Director Robert 
Moses failed to reach a consensus regarding the location of a new 
stadium. O'Malley's preferred site was in downtown Brooklyn. For 
this to be possible, the city would have to exercise its authority of 
eminent domain to acquire the land. Moses, however, was unwilling 
to exercise local government authority to condemn the land, claiming 
that, among other things, O'Malley's ballpark was not a sufficient 
public good to warrant such an action (Sullivan, 1987: 132). 
Other states and cities also try to pull teams to their locale by 
offering land and economic development incentives not available in a 
team's current location. Clearly, Los Angeles was more willing than 
New York City to meet O'Malley's demands for favourable land 
policies. After jumping several political hurdles, O'Malley acquired 
Chavez Ravine and built Dodger Stadium on that site (see Sullivan, 
1987: 162-79). Moreover, the lure of community development can be 
used to convince citizens that bringing a franchise to their area, with 
all of the concomitant costs, will be worthwhile. In encouraging 
voters to support improvements for Arlington Stadium to attract a 
major league franchise, Arlington's corporate regime 'sold' profes-
sional baseball as the centerpiece of an emerging recreation industry. 
Public dollars, they argued, would provide the first rush of success; 
private dollars would follow (Rosentraub, 1988: 79). 
Economic development policies and neighbourhood acceptance of 
these redevelopment plans Can also hold a franchise in a city. While 
many openly wonder how a business that employs only a few full-time 
equivalent (FfE) employees can be considered for a multi-million 
dollar economic development package by state and local govern-
ments, regimes may argue that sports will provide millions of dollars 
in revenues to the local economy, thereby justifying the generous 
government subsidies and infrastructure costs as well as providing 
jobs and some social gains for area residents. Moreover, it is argued 
that other businesses are indirect beneficiaries of government aid to 
sports franchises. Ranney, for example, contends that some com-
panies considering relocating out of the city may base their decision 
" 
" 
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to remain on the fact that a professional sports team is in the central 
city. According to Ranney, 'If that is no longer the case, it may make 
them [the companies] more footloose' (Burton and Griffin, 1986). 
Government redevelopment for private stadiums, of course, is no 
small investment. Publicly financed residential relocation and new 
housing for those displaced by the stadium, as well as new transporta-
tion and other infrastructure improvements, are often just the initial 
policies formulated for sports. The subsequent policy agenda by the 
regime may include new parks, redevelopment of old commercial 
districts ~nto industrial parks, and creation of tax increment financing 
(TIF) districts to pay for sports area redevelopment"" all community 
development objectives. 
Regulatory policy is another area in which regimes can affect sports 
franchises. Some communities have been accused of having too much 
government regulation of sports. Examples include policies that limit 
team revenues or assess taxes on sports operations; control of sports 
operations from parking to ticket sales; and lack of parking and 
restrictions on mass transit shuttle service to games (Washburn, 
1987). One obvious form of regulation occurs in the contractual 
arrangements between sports teams and local governments in the 
form of leases on public stadiums. The nature of the lease contract 
between the owners and the public 'authority, city, or county govern-
ments has been cited as a factor pushing teams out. For example, in 
threatening to leave the city, the National Football League Chicago 
Bears argued that they have a bad arrangement with the Chicago 
Park District at Soldier Field which seriously impairs the team's 
ability to make a profit (Gibson, 1987). Less regulation by other 
communities becomes a reason for relocation. Lower amusement 
taxes (young, 1986), fewer federal or state regulatory agency (e.g., 
EPA) restrictions on site usage, or even greater control over parking 
and concessions are examples of regulatory conditions that may 'pull' 
a team to a new area. 
A key political reason for sports franchises to remain in their 
present locale is the willingness of local regime to formulate regulat-
ory policy changes that are more favourable to the team. The most 
important regulatory agenda item in communities has recently been 
the creation of a public stadium authority for the building and opera-
tion of a new facility for the team. Modification of the existing leases 
at public stadiums is another agenda item, particularly when it in-
cludes more revenue-producing Skyboxes for the owners. 
Fiscal policies are a third area in which regimes may formulate 
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sports policy. Taxes constitute the most significant fiscal factor affect-
ing sports franchises. Teams will cite real estate taxes, amusement 
taxes, and local business taxes paid on their activities in a city as 
major sources of dissatisfaction. The shortage of bond money for a 
new publicly financed stadium is another fiscal problem that can push 
teams to other locales. Even opposition of the hotel industry to an 
increased transient occupancy tax for stadiums has become a pushing 
force in the past (McCarron and Egler, 1987). Fiscal policies that are 
high on the sports franchise agenda and must often be considered by 
urban regimes include state aid, local assistance for renovation or 
relocation, tax breaks, and the use of government borrowing auth-
ority. Boston's leaders, for example, granted tax relief and subsidies 
to the owners of Fenway Park and Boston Garden in order to prevent 
the movement of sports franchises from the city, while arena and 
franchise owner Abe Pollin was granted tax abatement by Prince 
George's County, Maryland, in the face of his threats to relocate the 
NHL Washington Capitals (Johnson, 1984: 220). 
Perhaps the most important role for the regime, however, is to 
formulate policies that help to mediate the con1lict within the com-
munity over sports policy. Because a tension exists in every plan 
between social, economic, and physical objectives, the regime must 
prioritise and attempt to manage conflict to a successful policy con-
clusion. Policies that will help to manage conflict may rang~ from the 
mayor publicly announcing a desire to help a team, to the arranging 
of compromises with regime elements over the sports agenda, to 
lobbying other governmental levels for policies favourable to the 
team, to resolving neighbourhood residents' problems with stadiums 
or their development. Franchise owners are often frustrated by the 
political environment of the city and/or state that hosts their team. 
Not receiving the 'proper' support from a mayor or governor and 
their governing coalition is often noted as a reason to leave a com-
munity (Henson and King, 1982: 299-303). Even when the regime is 
forthcoming with support for a new policy to appease the team, the 
politicking in the legislature and in the other special district govern-
ments with which the owners must deal can be a source of discourage-
ment - which also warrants regime action. 
Neighbourhood resistance to a proposed new city stadium can be 
quite vocal. Groups may be organised around the call to 'save our 
homes' (Kass, 1988a; 1988b), and protest becomes a common 
strategy to scuttle redevelopment plans for stadiums. Such actions 
may help to push a franchise to a new locale. Discrimination suits 
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have even been filed when the neighbourhood being taken for a 
stadium is predominantly black (Gorman, 1989). More favourable 
community reactions in other locales can help pull teams out of the 
city. Many suburban residents and their leaders, who have less acute 
social objectives, want central city sports franchises to relocate in the 
suburban sector of the metropolitan area. All of this puts pressure on 
the regime for policy action. 
Developing favourable attitudes in the community toward new 
stadiums also helps to hold the team in a city. Arranging favourable 
buyouts of homeowners and incentives for renters to relocate are 
ways in 'which the regime may help create advantageous climates for 
sports in its city. Many regimes are also willing to build a public 
stadium before finding a tenant and then use this as an attractive 
bargaining chip to lure a team from its present location. The Indiana-
polis regime, for example, built the Hoosier Dome, a luxury-box-
equipped stadium, and then went searching for a team (Harris, 1986: 
581). Providing jobs in the construction and operation of a sports 
facility also helps to blend the social, physical, and economic goals of 
community regimes. 
Retention of teams is aided by the intense lobbying of those within 
the regime who have a stake in keeping the teams in a state or city. Of 
course, some owners remain intent on moving, regardless of the 
policies formulated. Robert Irsay, owner of the Colts, was promised 
stadium improvements and other business incentives from Baltimore 
and the State of Maryland to keep him from moving the team to 
Indianapolis. Despite the efforts to 'hold' the Colts, Irsay left, 
perhaps because of the ill-will that had come to characterise his 
relationship with the city and its fans (Harris, 1986: 90, 189,602-7). 
Governing coalitions' responses to sports issues are often set in 
motion by sports team owners. The franchise owners typically want 
public approval to use their private resources to enhance team rev-
enues. If they want to build a privately owned stadium for economic 
reasons, resident relocation, a social concern, and infrastructure 
improvements may be the reasons that the owners seek the support of 
city hall for the projects. Sometimes, team owners do not want to 
spend any of their own resources on development. Instead, they may 
want public funds to be used to construct a new stadium for the team. 
This often confirms the assessment of Doig (1987) that businessmen 
desire to have the risk of financial loss associated with a sports facility 
shifted to the public sector. Policy formulation often leads to a state 
policy agenda change, also. The central need for state government 
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money and laws to support the resolution of sports issues will often 
lead to compromise between the agendas of state and community. 
Successfu~ policy formulation also usually results from a regime evok-
ing the 'public interest' when promoting sports i,ssues. But in a sense, 
sports are unique; the high visibility and popularity of profession:u 
sports make the team-city relationship a matter of great pubbc 
interest (Johnson, 1986: 430) and introduces some novel problems for 
the urban regime. The spectator and fan can be frequent references 
for those seekingto articulate 'the public interest' in sports policy. 
CHICAGO'S REGIME AND SPORTS POUCY 
Our analysis of sportS policy formulation has been informed by a 
lengthy study of Chicago and its sports teams. In previous research 
we have detailed the role that urban regimes played in the develop-
ment of stadiums for baseball and football in Chicago (Pelissero, 
Henschen, and Sidlow, 1991) Jnd we examined the inno~ative nature 
of sports policy-making processes and outcomes (pelissero, Hen-
schen, and Sidlow, forthcoming). During three mayoral administra-
tions, Chicago provided a particularly rich example of the way in 
which the urban regime formulates sports policy and it tries to fit it 
into community development programmes. Here we summarise key 
sports policy decisions during the Progressive Regime of Harold 
Washington and Eugene Sawyer (1983-9) and the evolving 
CorporatelManagement Regime of Richard M. Daley (1989-91). 
Sports PoIk:y during a Progressive Regime 
Harold Washington was electCd ~ayor in 1983 by a progressive 
electoral coalition, one which expected to see Chicago's regime trans-
formed from its machine roots to one that gave neighbourhoods at 
least as much attention in policy decisions as the greater downtown. 
So it was to be a dilemma of sorts for the administration whenever it 
confronted sports issues because all of Chicago's professional teams 
(except the Bears) play in stadiums that are located in .residential 
communities where social concerns in policy formulatIon are as 
important ~nomic ones. But the issues were abundant. The Trib-
une Company, owner of the Cubs asked for permission to play night 
baseball games in Wrigley Field, a request strongly opposed by 
Wrigleyville residents. The owners of the White Sox, Jerry Reinsdorf 
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and Eddie Einhorn, informed the city in 1985 that they needed a new 
stadium to replace the crumbling Comiskey Park, which was built 
near the Bridgeport and Armour Square neighbourhoods in 1910. 
The Washington administration was also informed by the Chicago 
Bears that its lease on Soldier Field was relatively poor compared to 
other NFL teams, a problem that could be corrected with a new 
stadium in another residential part of the city. 
Mayor Washington and his progressive regime proposed the first of 
several economic development plans for sports teams in April 1986. 
He called for construction of a multi-team stadium for football and 
baseball as part of the redevelopment of the South Loop section of 
the city, a plan with mainly fiscal and economic 'objectives. When 
both the White Sox and the Bears rejected sharing a stadium, the 
regime embraced a' White Sox plan to build a new stadium near the 
old Comiskey Park. This new economic development plan was 
accompanied by the formulation of a regulatory policy that would 
allow for governmental control over the public and private interests 
involved in land acquisition, residential relocation, stadium demoli-
tion and construction, and operation of a new Comiskey Park. The 
lllinois Sports Facilities Authority (ISFA) was created to build and 
operate a $120 million stadium across the street from the existing 
Comiskey Park. 
But the White Sox complained in 1987 that the ISFA was moving 
too slowly on stadium plans and that the social issue of neighbour-
hood residents who did not want to relocate had become obstacles to 
redevelopment. With a threat to move the White Sox to St. Peters-
burg, a community building a stadium and looking for a tenant team, 
they forced the regime to engage in high stakes bargaining and 
conflict management to keep the White Sox in Chicago and pacify 
upset residents. The Governor, James Thompson, the General 
Assembly, and the Chicago regime settled on new terms for a White 
Sox stadium in June 1988 that met team owners' economic objectives 
and provided adequate financial incentives to settle the social con-
cerns for dislocated residents. The urban regime, now under the 
caretaker stewardship of Acting Mayor Eugene. Sawyer was in-
strumental in mediating conflict within the--mainly black, working 
class neighbourhood hit hardest by redevelopment and avoided court 
fight. 
Mayor Washington had also sought an accommodation within the 
regime on a fair share of contracts for minorities in the construction 
and operation of the new ballpark (Hornung, 1987: 1). In particular, 
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he convinced the ISFA to increase the minority contracting policy 
from the state-mandated 5 per cent of contracts to the more progres-
sive 25 per cent used by Chicago, with an additional 5 per cent for 
female-headed firms, a goal exceeded in 1990. 
In addressing the issue of a new stadium for the White Sox, the 
urban regime accommodated a corporatist agenda while maintaining 
neighbourhood and community support. The Sox deal was couched 
in economic development terms, and regulatory powers were used to 
achieve governmental control over both the public and private 
interests that were involved. Fiscal policies, including the retirement 
of construction bonds, through lease payments and hotel taxes, were 
developed to fund the project. Finally, the Washington-sawyer 
coalition successfully mediated the conflict that emerged over the Sox 
stadium - not only that which was produced by the Sox' dissatisfaction 
with the original stadium package and their threats to move to Florida, 
but also that which characterised the South Armour Square residents' 
opposition to stadium construction and their own relocation. 
The progressive regime's response to the Bears' interest in a new 
stadium reflects many of the same elements of policymaking that 
were evident in its negotiations with the White Sox. The Bears 
argued that their lease with the Chicago Park District for the use of 
Soldier Field is bad compared to other teams. In 1986, team Presi-
dent Michael McCaskey indicated that the team's long term goal was 
to move from Soldier Field to a new team-built stadium. In spite of 
opposition from many Chicago groups, Mayor Washington endorsed 
a Bears' proposal to tear down Soldier Field and rebuild a stadium in 
the same area (Strong and McCarron, 1986). By early 1987 the 
regime abandoned this idea and supported a new Bears' plan to build 
on the West Side of the city. The stadium plan was supported by the 
regime as part of an economic development package that would also 
bring physical infrastructure and social benefits to one of Chicago's 
most blighted neighbourhoods. A new football stadium was viewed 
as the centerpiece of a large urban renewal programme that was to 
include 'parks, stores, housing for low-and-moderate-income families 
and an "urban economic development zone'" (McCarron and Pier-
son, 1987). In addition, the fiscal plan envisioned redevelopment of 
an old commercial district on the West Side into an industrial park 
that could produce tax revenues. 
Mayor Washington created the West Side Development Commit-
tee, comprised of progressive supporters and financial leaders who 
were key players in his governing cOalition to insure that redevelop-
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ment of the area for the corporate owners of the Bears would include 
social benefits for the community (McCarron and Galvan, 1987; 
McCarron, 1987). Following Washington'S death in late 1987 the city 
continued with its support of the West Side privately-financed Bears 
stadium. The stadium plan posed conflict management problems for 
the progressive regime. Two neighbourhood groups that had been 
part of Washington's electoral coalition took opposite positions on 
the proposal, one seeing major social goals being met, the other only 
business goals. But when Illinois legislators failed to grant Mayor 
Sawyer's request for $30 million in state funds for infrastructure 
improvements necessary for stadium construction in 1988, they in 
effect put an end to the West Side plan for the Bears (Strong, 1988). 
Sports Polley and the CorporateiManagement Regime 
In 1989, the election of a new mayor, Richard M. Daley, presented 
sports business owners with a new kind of regime, one which sup-
ported sound corporate objectives but more interested in better 
management of the city than in either development or social policy. 
Bears executives sought support for still another stadium site, this 
time south of the Loop. But Mayor Daley was skeptical about allow-
ing the Bears to build near a growing residential area which was 
attracting the middle class (Karwath, 1989). 
The 19908 have brought new efforts to make a Bears stadium part of 
an economic development package. Plans were refocused on a publicly-
built domed football stadium attached to the already existing McCor-
mick Place convention centre. Though the Bears' McCaskey expressed 
little enthusiasm for the proposal, Governor Thompson and Mayor 
Daley conVinced him that it was the team's last chance for a publicly-
subsidised stadium (McCarron, 19908). The Bears signed a thirty-year, 
fixed rate rental agreement in June, 1990 (McCarron, 1990b), but Illi-
nois General Assembly failed to approve it. Throughout 1990 and early 
1991 attempts to revive McDome were made by drawing attention to the 
economic benefits of the project and the development of fiscal policy to 
fund it. The Daley regime and its McCormick Place partners supported 
the domed stadium project and pledged to work toward a socially-
responsible goal of giving minorities and females 32 to SO per cent of the 
jobs and subcontracts when it was developed (Mount, 1990). By 1991 
the promoters had dropped the expensive domed-stadium from the 
convention centre expansion plans. 
The Bears remain with an unfulfiHed corporate dream of a new 
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stadium and look beyond Chicago for opportunities to meet their 
economic goals through relocation. The city's regime continues to 
explore other sound policies that could keep the Bears in chicago, 
providing economic and fiscal benefits to the community. 
A renewed plan for a West Side stadium was finalised in 1991. 
However, instead of a football stadium this is to be a new basketball-
hockey facility the city's NHL and NBA franchises. The privately-
financed stadium will require about $30 million in area infrastructure 
improvements, which the Daley regime has approved. Purchase of 
neighbourhood homes is to be handled by the stadium developers, 
not the city. This redevelopment will bring some area improvements 
but does not embrace any major social goals. Businessmen with an 
interest in this stadium plan had their proposals easily approved by 
the Daley regime, while neighbourhood residents and progressives 
were largely left out of the process. 
DISCUSSION 
Urban regimes are intimately involved with the formation of sports-
led development policy. In most cases the regime seems to mediate a 
variety of proposals that have been formulated and often strikes a 
compromise on a set of policies that will meet the CC?mpeting 
development goals of the community. When it comes to the issue of 
professional spectator sports, the stadium has surfaced as a 'logical' 
extension of development policy. But the formation of an economic 
development agenda that embraces policies for sports franchises is 
not an easy one to adopt. As the case study of Chicago shows, urban 
regimes have had to rely upon the tools of economic development, 
regulation, and fiscal policy, as well as the process of conflict 
management to bring policy to fruition. But as in the case of the 
Chicago Bears, not every formulated policy leads to successful policy 
adoption, particularly if social objectives of community development 
are unclear and economic objectives of businesses seem more 
prominent. 
Urban regimes often must find an accommodation between the 
regime agendas and community development objectives on sports 
developments. Table" 9.1 presents a summary view of how develop-
ment objectives rank with regimes on sports policies. Essentially. 
community development embraces one or all of the objectives listed 
in that figure. Economic and fiscal objectives are most often at the 
Community Development or Business Promotion? 
Table 9.1 A model of regimes, sports policies, and community 
development objectives 
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Regime Priorities in Sporn Policy Formation 
Community Development 
Objectives 
Economic and Fiscal 
Social 
Physical (Infrastructure! 
AppearanCe) 
CorporatelMlI1IIlgement Progressive 
1 2 
3 1 
2 3 
heart of community development. Stimulating or expanding the econ-
omic base of the community and enhancing the city's fiscal resources 
are embodied in most development initiatives. So too are physical 
improvements in an area of the city where new infrastructure and 
other public works or facilities are designed to improve the appear-
ance and utility of the built environment. And community develop-
ment has, since its inception, promoted social objectives such as 
improved housing and quality of life for area residents. 
Our review of sports-led developmeJlt and relocation issues, as well 
as our case study of Chicago, suggest that regiines follow different 
priorities when molding sports policies into community development 
plans. To the corporate regimes the prime consideration in support-
ing sports policy formation is whether or not the plan will meet 
economic and fiscal objectives of development. Expanding the 
opportunities fot profit, employment, and tax savings are important 
to the business-dominated corporate regimes. These regimes and 
their management variety appear to have physical objectives as a 
second priority in sports development. And social objectives of com-
munity development is a distant third priority, often only embraced 
when the regime believes that it is the only way to manage conflict 
that ensues from sports policy formulation. 
In contrast, we have seen that the progressive regimes formulate 
sports policy with a different set of community development objec-
tives in mind. Predominant social concerns are apparent in the 
progressive-led drive for sports policies. Insuring that the neighbour-
hood residents and disadvantaged groups are accommodated is quite 
important to progressive regimes. Hence, while they also seek econ-
omic benefits, particularly jobs and contracts for progressive sup-
porters, and fiscal rewards such as expanded tax bases and new city 
revenues, these are secondary to social concerns. And while physical 
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improvements in the built environment are important, these should 
exceed the minimal needs of the area immediately adjacent to a 
sports facility and provide wider areal benefits to the community. 
But does the policy solution ever truly meet the interests of the 
public, or serve the general welfare? Unfortunately, a natural tension 
exists between development objectives and regimes' divergent sports 
policies. That is why corporate regimes are willing to accept some 
social objectives in the sports development plans in order to move 
ahead with the project. And progressives accept the economic gains 
for businessmen that follow from sports development in order to 
secure social and economic benefits for their allies. Both kinds of 
regimes cloak their own plans in the public interest in order to sell 
these to their partners and the public. Regimes recognise that the 
greater good of the community is served when the governing coalition 
successfully manages the natural conflicts that arise in development 
plans. The stagnation of policy can make team owners seek alterna-
tive sites for their operations and has externalities for the greater 
community and sports fans. Civic pride in a team is often called upon 
when sports issues are vying for a place on the development agenda. 
We are also left with many questions about sports and policy. If 
policies are successfully implemented, who benefits? Can a progres-
sive regime oversee direct benefits to its supporters? Is the public 
interest served by the millions of dollars in public expenditures on 
sports stadiums? What are the long-term effects of regime support for 
sports development? Are sports stadiums loss-leaders and destined to 
be owned by the public, which incurs the risk of their development 
and operation? Can the pulling forces on team owners to relocate to 
more attractive sites - other cities and states - ever be controlled? Or 
can team owners ever be held accountable for abandoning a city after 
the public has invested its tax dollars and emotions in an eternal 
home for a team? Most of these questions - and more - await future 
research. 
Note 
1. This research was supported by a Small Research Grant from the Office of 
Research Services, Loyola University, Chicago. 
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10 Community Based 
Economic Development: 
The British Experience 
Richard MacFarlane 
THE POLICY CONTEXT 
In the 1980s in Britain a principal policy preoccupation of Central 
Government has been to increase the impact of market forces on the 
provision of goods and services. It has encouraged industrial and 
commercial restructuring, sold-off public-sector industry and utilities, 
and sought to transfer public services (including welfare services) into 
the commercial sector . . . or at least make it subject to commercial 
management approaches. Local Government has spent much of the 
last ~ecade trying to defend services and the jobs of their employees; 
fightmg for the concept of public service and municipal provision. A 
by-product of the Governments' strategy has been a growing number 
of people who are unable to operate effectively in the labour market 
and therefore become reliant on welfare provision,l and a declining 
level and quality of welfare and public services which made it more 
difficult for them to escape from their dependency. 
The industrial restructuring had its greatest impact on traditional 
manufacturing industry based in the inner-cities and employing large 
numbers of unskilled and semi-skilled residents from neighbouring 
areas of low-cost housing and the urban-fringe housing estates built in 
the era of slum-clearance. The industrial cities and localities have 
traditionally been socialist strongholds and the Local Authorities in 
these areas have been those most committed to the maintenance of 
public services. So it has been the Labour controlled Local Auth-
orities, covering areas with high levels of economic and social dis-
tress, that have been at the forefront of opposition to Conservative 
Government policy. 
The confrontation about the philosophy of public provision 
between central and local policy makers has constrained the 
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